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Executive Summary
This is the Office of the Attorney General’s (“AGO”) 2018 report of its examination1 of health care 
cost trends conducted pursuant to Section 17 of Chapter 12C of the Massachusetts General Laws.  
Prior AGO cost trends reports have documented inefficiencies in the distribution of health 
care dollars.  Two of those key findings have been that there is (1) significant price variation 
among hospitals and physicians that is unrelated to quality2 and (2) significantly higher per 
capita spending on commercially insured people in more affluent communities as compared to 
less affluent ones despite the higher sickness burden found in less affluent communities.3  In 
this report, we examine the different ways commercial insurance companies pay health care 
providers for services and assess how these differences contribute to market inefficiencies.  
While total health care expenditures in Massachusetts grew only 1.6% in 2017—substantially 
below the state cost growth benchmark of 3.6%—consumers’ exposure to health care costs 
rose at a much higher rate.4  On average, fully-insured commercial premiums increased 4.9% 
in 2017 to $483 per month, with premiums for small employer groups increasing even more 
(6.9%).5  Enrollment in high deductible plans is also increasing in Massachusetts (from 20.9% in 
2015 up to 28.2% in 2017),6 exposing consumers to high out-of-pocket costs and increasing their 
need to shop effectively for high value health care services.  Consumers and employers rely on 
state health care reform initiatives like alternative payment methods and price transparency to 
curb health care cost increases and to help manage their increased financial exposure.  This 
report examines the underlying complexity and variation in health care payment arrangements 
and considers how they may increase administrative costs and impair the ability of consumers, 
employers, and referring providers to shop for the most cost-effective care.
Payments between payers and providers are based on complex contracts that detail how 
all health care services will be reimbursed.  Commercial insurers negotiate these multi-year 
contracts with providers to establish a mutual understanding of how and how much providers 
will be paid for delivering health care services to their members.  As we describe in detail below, 
these contracts use a wide range of methods for calculating the ultimate payment rates for a vast 
array of services.  This variability and complexity in how health care services are reimbursed add 
significant costs to the health care market and make price comparisons more difficult for market 
participants.
1 This report relies on information obtained through civil investigative demands issued to Massachusetts health insurers pursuant to Mass. Gen.  
Laws c. 12C, § 17.  We reviewed detailed information on health care contracting, prices, utilization, claims, and spending and consulted with 
health care experts, market participants, consumer advocates, and other key stakeholders.  To assist in its review, the AGO engaged experts 
with extensive experience in actuarial sciences and financial analysis, clinical quality evaluation and population health management, and insurer-
provider contracting.
2 OFF.  OF ATT’Y GEN., EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS (Mar.  16, 2010), available at https://www.mass.gov/
files/documents/2016/08/vn/2010-hcctd-full.pdf; OFF.  OF ATT’Y GEN., EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS 
(June 22, 2011) [HEREINAFTER AGO 2011 REPORT], available at https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/08/uy/2011-hcctd-full.pdf; OFF.  OF 
ATT’Y GEN., EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS (Apr.  24, 2013) [HEREINAFTER AGO 2013 REPORT], available 
at https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/08/xc/2013-hcctd.pdf; OFF.  OF ATT’Y GEN., EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND 
COST DRIVERS (Sep.  18, 2015), available at https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/05/04/cost-containment-5-report.pdf.
3 AGO 2011 REPORT, supra note 2; OFF.  OF ATT’Y GEN., EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS (Oct.  13, 2016), 
available at https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/10/ts/cc-market-101316.pdf.
4 CTR.  FOR HEALTH INFO.  & ANALYSIS, PERFORMANCE OF THE MASS.  HEALTH CARE SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT SEPTEMBER 2018 at 7 (Sept.  
2018) [HEREINAFTER 2018 CHIA ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.chiamass.gov/assets/2018-annual-report/2018-Annual-Report.pdf.
5 Id.  at 8.
6 Id.  at 65.
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This report is organized into three sections.  Section 1 documents the variation and complexity in 
health care payment practices associated with hospital outpatient services (Section 1.A), hospital 
inpatient services (Section 1.B), and risk contracts (Section 1.C).  To illustrate this variation and 
complexity, the report includes examples related to payment for hospital observation services 
(Section 1.A.ii) and obstetrics services (Section 1.B.ii).  Section 2 reports on the implications of this 
complexity, highlighting the increased administrative costs (Section 2.A.) and the impact on price 
transparency (Section 2.B).  Finally, Section 3 summarizes our recommendations.  
Our principal findings are as follows:
1. Commercial health care fee-for-service payments are determined using complex and 
varied methods with little consistency across payers, providers, or insurance products.
a. Hospital outpatient payment methods are particularly complex and varied, with 
the largest payers using different approaches to fee schedules and other forms of 
payment.
b. Hospital inpatient payment methods are somewhat more consistent across the 
largest payers as the market has moved towards adopting DRG-based payment 
methods,7 but significant variation remains across smaller payers.
2. Risk contracts are also complex and vary from payer to payer, adding another layer of 
complexity on top of the fee-for-service framework that underlies alternative payment 
methods.
3. The complex and varied payment system generates additional administrative costs that 
do not appear to add value to patient care, patient experience, or patient or provider 
engagement.  It also serves as an obstacle to price transparency for consumers, 
employers, policymakers and providers.
Based on these findings, we make the following principal recommendations to policymakers, 
payers, providers, and consumer advocates:
1. Study further the administrative costs associated with the current complex and varied 
approaches to payment with the goal of identifying waste and achieving savings.
2. Reduce complexity and explore increased standardization where appropriate in the 
methods for determining health care payment rates.
3. Establish real-time, service-level price transparency for employers, consumers, 
policymakers, and providers.
The Office of the Attorney General looks forward to continued collaboration with the 
Legislature, other agencies, health care market participants, and all stakeholders in promoting 
the affordability and accessibility of health care for all Massachusetts residents.
7 A diagnosis related group or “DRG” is a methodology used to determine payment rates for hospital admissions.  See infra at page 7.
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I.  There Are Complex and Varied Methods 
for Determining Commercial Health Care 
Payment Rates.
As part of our examination, we reviewed commercial payer contracts for the hospitals affiliated 
with the largest Massachusetts hospital systems.8  As detailed below, our examination found 
variation in commercial payment practices across payers, insurance products, and providers for 
hospital outpatient services, hospital inpatient services, and risk contracts.  
a. Hospital Outpatient Payment Methods Are Particularly Complex and Varied.
Hospital outpatient services account for 63% of Massachusetts hospital commercial 
revenue on average across all payers.9  Hospital outpatient services account for 
an even higher percentage of commercial revenue for Massachusetts community 
hospitals.  From the largest Massachusetts commercial payer, on average 74% of 
community hospital commercial revenue is for outpatient services, with specific 
hospitals ranging from 49% to 98% outpatient revenue.10  Hospital outpatient 
spending is one of the service categories with the highest recent growth in total 
health care expenditures (4.8% growth in hospital outpatient spending as compared 
to growth in overall total health care expenditures of 1.6% in 2017).11  Due to its 
increasing volume and significance as a health care cost driver, hospital outpatient 
spending should be a priority area for cost containment and transparency efforts.  
i. Hospital Outpatient Fee Schedules Vary in Structure Across Payers.
The three largest commercial payers in Massachusetts typically use fee schedules 
as the basis for negotiating and establishing contractually agreed upon payment 
rates for hospital outpatient services.  A fee schedule is a detailed listing of 
hospital outpatient services and the corresponding “list” prices payers have 
established.  While the list of services and the codes used are generally the same 
across payers, the underlying base fees each commercial insurer establishes 
are unique to each insurer.  Each provider then typically negotiates “multipliers” 
that are used to inflate those base fees for groups of services.  For example, the 
parties may negotiate a multiplier of 1.2 for a certain set of hospital outpatient 
services, which means that the provider would receive 120% of the prices 
reflected in the payer’s fee schedule for the specified range of services.
8 This examination included data from payers pertaining to their contracts with Beth Israel Deaconess Care Organization, Lahey Health System, 
Partners HealthCare System, Steward Health Care System, UMass Memorial Health Care, and Wellforce.  Our examination did not address 
reimbursement for behavioral health services or pharmaceuticals, as the AGO has previously documented the complex reimbursement 
arrangements governing these areas.  See OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN., EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS (June 
30, 2015), available at https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/08/qz/hc-ct-cd-06-2015.pdf; OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN., EXAMINATION OF HEALTH 
CARE COST TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS (Oct. 7, 2016), available at https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/10/wk/cc-pharma-100716.pdf.
9 Based on a simple unweighted average of payer inpatient/outpatient commercial revenue reported by the Center for Health Information and 
Analysis. CTR. FOR HEALTH INFO. & ANALYSIS, RELATIVE PRICE PROVIDER PRICE VARIATION IN THE MASS. COMMERCIAL MARKET DATABOOK 
(Apr. 2018), available at http://www.chiamass.gov/assets/docs/r/pubs/18/Relative-Price-Databook-2018.xlsx.
10 Id.
11 2018 CHIA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 18.
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A different multiplier (e.g. 1.4 or 140% of the base fee schedule) could be 
negotiated for a different set of services.
In our examination of how Massachusetts payers pay for hospital outpatient 
services, we found significant differences in the way the largest three payers 
establish and use base fee schedules.
Different Approaches to Hospital Outpatient Fee Schedules
Payer 1 Payer 2 Payer 3
Number of outpatient billing service categories 17 12 4
Rate multipliers negotiated by outpatient billing 
service category? Yes Yes No
Note:
1. Data is based upon an analysis of the contracts between the three largest Massachusetts payers 
and the six largest Massachusetts hospital systems.
As illustrated in the chart above, two of the three major commercial payers use 
fee schedules with different service category groupings of hospital outpatient 
services for purposes of negotiating multipliers.  These groupings are not defined 
consistently across the two payers.  For example, one payer negotiates a single 
multiplier for radiology services while the other payer negotiates two multipliers—
one for general radiology and one for high tech radiology and sometimes yet a 
third category for “imaging agents.”  One payer divides its hospital outpatient fee 
schedule into seventeen groups of services while another payer uses twelve.  
This means there may be seventeen different multipliers for different hospital 
outpatient services for one payer and twelve multipliers for different hospital 
outpatient services for the other payer.
The third payer has four different service categories of hospital outpatient rates 
but does not use these categories as a basis for negotiating multipliers.  Instead, 
this payer starts with a fee schedule for each hospital.  It then negotiates an 
aggregate rate increase for that hospital’s outpatient services over the prior year, 
which is then realized through changes to the hospital-specific fee schedule.  This 
approach does not use negotiated “multipliers” for particular groups of services.
Adding to the complexity of service-specific multipliers, outpatient multipliers 
also often vary by insurance product, with different rates for health maintenance 
organization (“HMO”) and preferred provider organization (“PPO”) products.  
Further, some commercial payers have rates for certain hospitals that vary within 
products, with up to four different HMO prices for the same services and up to 
six different PPO prices.  These different rates within a single product category 
(such as within a payer’s PPO offerings) are differentiated based on factors such 
as the member’s employer group or primary care provider.  These rates can vary 
significantly: for one hospital system, PPO prices for the exact same services 
varied by up to 57% depending on the member’s employer.   
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Equally important, billing requirements also vary significantly across payers and 
providers.  Coding and authorization requirements, as well as documentation 
requirements for determination of medical necessity, vary significantly between 
commercial plans and sometimes across products within a plan. In addition, some 
providers are paid supplemental payments on top of their fee-based payments 
that are calculated without respect to claims-based billing.  
The result of this approach to establishing hospital outpatient prices by service 
category is that a hospital may be much less expensive than average for one type 
of service but much more expensive than average for another type of service.  To 
illustrate this variation, we examined three hospital outpatient services: surgical 
day care, laboratory, and radiology services.  As reflected in the chart below, these 
services account for substantial hospital outpatient spending.
Outpatient Total Medical Expenses by Service Category for One Massachusetts Payer (2017)
Notes:
1. Data is based on 2017 risk settlements from one payer for three large Massachusetts physician 
groups for an attributed population of approximately 80,000 members.
2. Data excludes behavioral health spending.
The use of multiple service categories with different negotiated multipliers within 
a single payer means that different services within a single hospital may vary 
in relative price.  The chart below depicts the hospital outpatient fee schedule 
multipliers applicable to surgical day care, laboratory, and high-tech radiology for 
one product offered by one large Massachusetts payer for the Massachusetts 
hospitals that contract through the six largest Massachusetts hospital systems.  
Each number on the horizontal axis represents a different hospital, with three 
corresponding points plotted on the chart to represent the hospital’s negotiated 
multipliers for each service as compared to the average multiplier for the service 
across this set of hospitals.
Examination of Health Care Cost Trends and Cost Drivers Pursuant to G.L. c. 12C, § 17 
Hospital Rate Multipliers for Three Outpatient Services for One Massachusetts Payer (2018)
Notes:
1. Includes hospitals that contract through the six largest Massachusetts hospital systems but excludes 
hospitals that are not paid based on a fee schedule for these services.
2. The average reflected in this chart is the unweighted average multiplier for the specific service 
category for this set of hospitals.
3. Where a contract included negotiated multipliers for ambulatory surgery centers owned by the hospital 
system, those ambulatory surgery centers are included as one hospital in the chart above. 
4. The multipliers for hospital 33 exceed 100% above average (Surgical Day Care 149%, Laboratory 229%, 
High-Tech Radiology 267%).
In the chart, the hospitals are organized in order of their multiplier for surgical day 
care (the blue circles), and this chart shows that other multipliers (laboratory as 
represented by orange triangles and high-tech radiology as represented by gray 
squares) often do not align with the surgical day care price.  
Our examination showed that it is difficult for a patient, employer, or referring 
provider to identify consistently the best value for a particular health care service.  
For example, a hospital that is a good value for outpatient surgery may not be a 
good value for radiology (like hospital 7 in the chart above).  While some hospitals 
are very expensive for almost everything, or very low-cost for almost everything, 
this was the exception.  We found that significant differences in payment rates 
across services existed at most hospitals.
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ii. Hospital Outpatient Payment Complexity Extends Beyond Fee Schedules and 
Billing Categories: Observation Services Case Study.
There are exceptions to the general rule that hospital outpatient services are 
reimbursed according to a fee schedule.  Negotiated approaches to payment for 
hospital outpatient services that do not fall within the typical fee schedules are 
complicated and inconsistent across payers.  To illustrate how payment rates are 
calculated for services that fall within these exceptions, we examined the different 
approaches to reimbursing hospitals for “observation” services.  Observation 
services are short-term treatments and assessments used to determine whether a 
patient needs to be admitted for inpatient care or can be discharged.  
We found significant variation within and across the largest Massachusetts payers 
in the way this service is reimbursed.  One insurer pays for observation services 
based on time increments but does not have standardized increments.  Instead, 
this payer breaks out time increments for purposes of billing in six different ways 
across its contracts with different hospitals.  Another payer uses a base rate for 
each hour of observation with a negotiated multiplier.  The third payer uses an 
all-inclusive rate for 24 hours of observation.  In addition, each of these rates 
generally varies by insurance product (e.g., HMO or PPO).  
The result of this structural complexity is that it is very difficult (1) to predict which 
hospitals are competitively priced or are likely to be a good value within any 
particular payer and (2) to assess value across payers without detailed case-
specific information.  Due to these different payment approaches, one cannot 
determine in advance whether certain hospitals are more expensive as compared 
to others for observation services, since the ultimate price will vary significantly 
based on the length of treatment and the applicable payment method.
b. Hospital Inpatient Payment Methods Are Somewhat More Standardized Across 
the Three Largest Payers, But Variation Exists Across the State.
For hospital inpatient services, payments are somewhat more standardized across the 
three major commercial payers in Massachusetts, but variation exists across the state.  
As summarized below, Massachusetts payers typically use some combination of four 
different methods for calculating hospital inpatient payment rates: diagnosis related 
groups (“DRGs”), case rates, per diems, and percent of charges (also called “payment 
on account factor”).  
A DRG is a methodology used to determine payment rates for hospital admissions.  
Medicare implemented DRG-based payments in 1981, and commercial insurers 
have slowly adopted this prospective payment method as an alternative to other 
retrospective methods of payment.  Under a DRG methodology, a base rate of 
payment is prospectively negotiated between each insurer and hospital, and this 
base rate drives the total payment level for each admission.  Upon each hospital 
discharge, all of the diagnoses, procedures, complications and co-morbidities, and 
other patient characteristics are coded and grouped using the software each payer 
uses to assign DRGs, called “groupers.”  Each assigned DRG is then associated 
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with payer-specific severity weights known as “case weights.”  The prospectively 
negotiated base rate is then multiplied by the case weight associated with the 
assigned DRG.  The number and types of DRGs vary across groupers, and the case 
weights associated with each grouper can vary as well.  Payers may use one or 
more DRG groupers, such as those developed by CMS for Medicare patients, or they 
may use other groupers developed for commercial or non-commercial populations.  
Payers may develop their own proprietary case weight systems or use commercial 
case weights or case weights derived from Medicare or Medicaid.  
Case rates are similar to DRGs as they are negotiated prospectively for certain 
specific categories of care, such as joint replacements, cardiac services, obstetrics 
and transplants.  Unlike DRGs, case rates are not adjusted for severity and generally 
are accompanied by negotiated outlier12 calculations that are not consistent with DRG 
methods of adjusting for outliers.  
Per diem payments are negotiated rates paid retrospectively based on the number of 
days a patient stayed in the hospital.
Percent of charges is a payment method in which a hospital is paid a negotiated 
discount off the hospital’s pricing list (called the hospital’s chargemaster).
i. The Three Largest Massachusetts Payers Use Principally DRGs for Hospital 
Inpatient Payment; Other Payers Use Per Diems and “Percent of Charges” 
Arrangements. 
As reflected in the chart below, the three largest Massachusetts payers (MA 
Payer 1, 2, and 3) use principally DRGs (blue bar) for hospital inpatient payment 
across their Massachusetts hospital contracts.  However, many payers use a 
combination of DRGs, per diems (green bar), and percent of charges (red bar) for 
payment for different services sometimes at the same hospital.  Data from two 
smaller Massachusetts plans (MA Payer 4 and 5 in the chart below) and a national 
plan showed that adoption of DRGs was more limited outside of the largest 
three payers.  For instance, one small Massachusetts plan pays over 90% of 
Massachusetts hospitals, at least in part, on a percent of charges basis.  Another 
small plan uses per diems in over 90% of its Massachusetts hospital contracts.  
The national payer reported using all three methods across a significant 
percentage of its Massachusetts hospital contracts.  Where different payment 
methods are used for the same services, it is difficult for a market participant to 
accurately assess relative value across health plans or even between provider 
options within a health plan.
12 An outlier is a particularly complex case that may trigger additional payments.
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Percent of Payers’ Massachusetts Hospital Contracts that  
Use DRG, Percent of Charges, and Per Diem for Inpatient Payment
Notes:
1. Data reported by payers for contracts in effect in May 2018 with Massachusetts acute care 
hospitals for commercial business.
2. Data excludes payment methods for behavioral health services.
3. A payer’s reported use of these payment methods may add up to over 100% where the payer 
uses multiple methods to pay some hospitals.  
4. Most payers surveyed also reported using case rates to pay for at least some types of hospital 
inpatient services.
Increased administrative resources are required for hospitals to maintain systems 
that simultaneously accommodate DRG-based payments, per diem payments, and 
condition-specific case rates.  Each of these inpatient payment methods comes 
with its own set of payment rules, contractually negotiated specifications, and 
payment policies and procedures.  The complexity of these systems not only leads 
to increased resource needs to adjudicate multiple systems, but also can lead to 
difficulty complying with billing specifications, resulting in claims denials, appeals, 
and additional work and costs associated with this appeal process.  
Administrative complexity is also costly for providers where insurers may use the 
same method of payment but have different ways of administering that particular 
method of payment.  For instance, while many insurers use DRGs for inpatient 
payments, each has its own contractual specifications and billing requirements.  
Several Massachusetts insurers use different DRG groupers or different versions of 
a particular grouper.  In addition, each insurer uses its own set of case weights.  All 
of these potential variations in the way DRGs are administered require providers 
to maintain multiple DRG billing systems and devote incremental resources to 
complying with variations in billing and contractual requirements.  While the three 
largest Massachusetts payers reported high rates of DRG adoption, they reported 
using different DRG grouper versions and case weights (some proprietary, some 
derived from Medicare).  These plan-specific grouping, coding, and severity 
adjustment systems introduce substantial administrative complexity.
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ii. Payment Methods for Obstetrics Illustrate the Lack of Standardization Within 
and Across Payers.
To illustrate inpatient billing and insurance-related complexity, we conducted 
a case study of the three largest payers’ approaches to payment for obstetrics 
services.  In this study we observed multiple approaches to payment for obstetrics 
including global case rates, per diems, and DRGs.  We found that among the three 
largest insurers in Massachusetts, all three payment methods were used across 
their networks.  That is, a single hospital is sometimes paid on a per diem by one 
insurer, global case rates for another insurer, and DRGs for another insurer.  In 
addition, we also observed rate variation by product (e.g., HMO or PPO) as well as 
by product segment (e.g., by the member’s primary care provider or employer).  
As reflected in the chart below, we observed substantial variation in the billing 
specifications for global case rates, per diems, and DRGs for obstetrics services.  
Not only did we see the same obstetrics services paid for in three distinct payment 
methods, but each of the payment methods lacked standard billing specifications 
within and across payers.  For instance, we observed different categorizations of 
the services to be included in the global case rates, with some payers offering just 
two categories of rates (one for vaginal delivery and one for caesarian delivery) 
and others breaking out four categories based on whether the delivery had 
complications and whether care for the healthy newborn is included.  We also 
observed variation across provider contracts regarding the specifications of outlier 
payments and in when an outlier payment is triggered (e.g., Day 5 versus Day 6).  
We found the per diem rates used across the plans for obstetrics services to be 
generally comparable to one another in structure: a negotiated rate multiplied by 
the number of days of the admission.  Rates are generally set with one rate for the 
first day of the admission and a second rate for subsequent days.  However, rates 
varied by and within products.  Some hospitals had more than one HMO rate while 
others had just one.  
We also observed variation in the administration of DRGs for obstetrics services 
(such as grouper type and version, case weights, and variation across products).  
DRG rates are more likely to be predictable and comparable across plans if case 
weights, DRG groupers, and product structure are standardized.
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Variation in Obstetrics Payment Methods
Global Case Rates Per Diems DRGs
Standardized Service Categories? No N/A No
Standardized Outlier Definition? No N/A No
Standardized Base Payment Structure? No Yes Yes
Standardized Rates Across Products and 
Product Segments? No No No
Note:
1. Data is based upon an analysis of the contracts between the three largest Massachusetts payers 
and the six largest Massachusetts hospital systems.
Our study of obstetrics services is just one example of variation in hospital 
inpatient payment methods.  We found significant variation within and across 
payers for other hospital inpatient services similar to the variation observed 
in obstetrics.  In particular, we found variation in payment methods for cardiac 
services, bariatric surgery, transplants, joint replacement, and vascular surgery.  
We also observed, outside of obstetrics services, that hospital inpatient payment 
methods may vary based on individualized exceptions or nuances that augment 
payment structures due to contractual variation in payment specifications.  These 
contractual variations in payment approaches present significant complexity 
with regard to how a service is defined, how outliers are defined and paid for, 
and whether services are eligible for additional payments for certain implantable 
devices or high-cost drugs.
c. Risk Contracts Vary Significantly Across Payers and Providers.
Risk contracts are intended to incent providers to deliver higher-value care.  Under a 
risk arrangement, insurers and providers negotiate a monthly budget for a covered 
population, and the providers are rewarded at the end of the year if they spend below 
their negotiated budget or penalized if they spend more than that budget.  In addition 
to this efficiency incentive, most of these arrangements also include certain quality 
and patient satisfaction bonuses.  
Our examination found that risk contracts vary in significant ways, with many contracts 
significantly capping or limiting efficiency risk exposure and bonus opportunities.  We 
observed certain products and plans that had significant opportunities for rewards 
and bonuses, while others had very limited opportunity.  Our study found, for 
instance, that the incentive and surplus opportunity in PPO arrangements are often 
significantly less than in HMO products.  
Such variation across plans and products limits providers’ incentives to invest in 
systems and services that could reduce healthcare costs over time because patients 
move from one plan to another.  If patients move from a plan with attractive risk 
terms and budgets to a different insurer or product that has less attractive risk terms 
and budgets (or to a fee-for-service product with no provider risk), a provider is less 
likely to invest in cost-reducing initiatives.  Without alignment among insurers on how 
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budgets are set and the level of provider risk and opportunity, when patients migrate 
between plans, the incentives can shift significantly for providers.  To illustrate the 
migration of members among plans, we looked at member persistency for a large 
Massachusetts plan and found that year over year approximately 5-15% of members 
did not stay in the same product, either leaving for a different payer or for a different 
product within the same payer.  This means that over a five-year period, as much as 
20-50% of membership can move to another plan or product, significantly altering a 
provider’s attributed population and reward potential.
Furthermore, like the fee-for-service framework these risk arrangements are 
layered over, alternative payment methods are highly variable with virtually no 
standard approach to the complex budget and expense calculations, settlement 
processes, and other administrative and contractual specifications that define these 
arrangements.  Below is a list of the key terms that define a provider’s resources 
and efficiency incentives under risk contracts where we observed variation across 
contracts.
Key Areas of Variation Across Risk Terms
Notes:
1. Data is based upon an analysis of the contracts and risk settlements between the three largest 
Massachusetts payers and the six largest Massachusetts hospital systems.
2.  This chart does not include terms related to quality.
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These terms illustrate areas where risk contracts are not comparable to one 
another across payers or providers, leading to very different actual risk and 
incentive exposure for providers who participate in risk contracts.  For example, our 
examination found variation in the liability maximums that govern risk sharing across 
different risk contracts.  The liability maximum is a cap on the provider’s losses 
if the provider spends more than the negotiated budget to care for an attributed 
population.  For one payer, we found physician liability maximums ranging from $5.87 
up to $25 per member per month across large Massachusetts provider groups.  
In previous examinations, we also noted significant differences in the negotiated 
budgets between providers.13
Risk settlements are complicated processes that take up to a year to complete after 
the end of the contract risk period.  Auditing, confirming, and interpreting these risk 
provisions, adjustments, and appeals requires significant resources from providers 
and insurers.  The complexity of these arrangements means insurers and providers 
must devote additional resources to negotiating and administering these unique and 
varied arrangements.
13 See AGO 2013 REPORT, supra note 2; OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN., EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS (Sep. 18, 2015), 
available at https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/05/04/cost-containment-5-report.pdf.
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II. The Complex and Varied Payment System 
Has Significant Implications for the 
Commonwealth’s Health Care Cost 
Containment Goals.
a. Administrative Complexity Adds Substantial Costs to the Health Care System.
Administering a complicated and varied set of health care payment methods 
is expensive.  Although there have not been published studies of this cost in 
Massachusetts, one important study estimated that administrative costs represented 
between $107 billion and $389 billion nationally in wasteful spending in 2011.14  This 
study concluded that “[r]educing waste is by far the largest, most humane, and 
smartest opportunity for evolving an affordable health care system,”15 finding that of 
the six “wedges” of waste in the U.S. health care system, the largest is administrative 
complexity—the waste driven by inefficiency in how the health care system is 
administered.16
More recent national studies have similarly documented the continued high 
cost of administrative complexity in our health care system.  A study comparing 
administrative costs of hospitals in eight nations found that in the United States 
administrative costs account for 25.3% of hospital expenditures, the highest percent 
of the eight nations.17  Administrative costs are a major driver behind the difference 
in overall health care cost between the US and other countries.18  In fact, reducing 
US spending for hospital administration to that of Canada would have saved 
approximately $158 billion in 2011 dollars.19  Likewise, another study looking at 
administrative costs in a multisite, multispecialty medical group found that for every 
ten physicians, there were almost seven full-time equivalent employees engaged in 
billing and insurance-related (“BIR”) activities.20  Approximately 62% of administrative 
costs can be attributed to BIR activities.21  Not only is the cost attributable to BIR 
activities high, but it appears to be growing.  A national study found that in 2009 
costs associated with BIR activities represented 14.4% of total health expenditures, 
and by 2012 such costs represented 16.8%.22
14 Donald M. Berwick & Andrew D. Hackbarth, Eliminating Waste in US Health Care, 307(14) JAMA 1513, 1515 (Apr. 2012).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 David U. Himmelstein et al., A Comparison of Hospital Administrative Costs in Eight Nations: US Costs Exceed All Others By Far, 33:9 HEALTH 
AFFAIRS 1586, 1589 (Sep. 2014).  See also David M. Cutler, Reducing Health Care Costs: Decreasing Administrative Spending, Testimony for 
Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (Jul. 31 2018) (stating that “[t]he typical hospital spends nearly 10 cents out of every 
dollar collected collecting that dollar; the typical physician’s office spends even more”).
18 Himmelstein, supra note 17, at 1593.
19 Id.
20 Julie Ann Sakowski et al., Peering Into the Black Box: Billing and Insurance Activities in a Medical Group, 28:4 HEALTH AFFAIRS 544, 547 (May 14, 
2009), available at https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.28.4.w544.
21 Philip Tseng et al., Administrative Costs Associated with Physician Billing and Insurance-Related Activities at an Academic Health Care System, 
319(7) JAMA 691, 692 (Feb. 2018).
22 Elsa Pearson, How much is too much? What does the US actually spend on health care administration?, The Incidental Economist (Apr. 4, 2018), 
available at https://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/how-much-is-too-much-what-does-the-us-actually-spend-on-health-care-administration/.
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There is no evidence that these higher administrative costs translate to higher-value 
care.  While one could imagine a scenario in which more administration would reduce 
overall costs by eliminating other waste or increasing efficiency, data suggest the 
opposite.  As reported, the eight-nation study found that “total hospital costs were 
highest in the nations that had the highest hospital administrative costs.”23  This study 
is consistent with our finding that providers are paid in different, idiosyncratic ways 
by the different plans with whom they contract.  We did not identify evidence that 
this kind of administrative complexity and its associated costs are bringing value to 
patients, plan sponsors, or insurers.  
b. The Complex Payment System Serves as a Barrier to Actionable Price 
Transparency. 
Our findings on the variation and complexity of payment methods also have 
implications for health care price transparency and market-driven cost containment 
initiatives.  We found a wide range of payment methods in use across Massachusetts 
payers and providers for determining the rates paid for hospital inpatient and 
outpatient services.  As described above, payment rates for certain services may be 
determined on a per diem basis for one insurer and a DRG basis for another insurer, 
with rates that further vary depending on whether the patient has an HMO or PPO 
product.  This individualized approach to payment arrangements makes “apples to 
apples” price comparisons difficult for market participants like consumers, employers, 
and providers who want to identify high value health care services and products.
The difficulty of making actionable price comparisons is easiest to model for 
outpatient services.  We found that outpatient fee schedules are generally subdivided 
into varying service groupings for purposes of negotiating prices.  Price negotiations 
at the service group level result in variation in relative prices for services within the 
same hospital that raises questions about the appropriateness of using aggregated 
hospital prices for purposes of comparing outpatient service prices among hospitals.  
For example, the existence of intra-hospital price differences by service means that 
aggregate relativity indices like Relative Price24 mask the fact that one hospital may 
be high-priced for some services and lower-priced for others.  This adds a hidden 
level of complexity to discussions of provider relative price and means that aggregate 
measures—while valuable for analysis of the health care market and overall relativities 
in price—are not well tailored to capture variation in prices for specific services.  
The chart below shows the most recent outpatient Relative Price index for one 
payer mapped against the current laboratory multipliers in effect for the same set of 
hospitals for the same payer.25
23 Himmelstein, supra note 17 at 1592.
24 See CTR. FOR HEALTH INFO. & ANALYSIS, RELATIVE PRICE PROVIDER PRICE VARIATION IN THE MASS. COMMERCIAL MARKET (Apr. 2018), 
available at http://www.chiamass.gov/assets/docs/r/pubs/18/Relative-Price-Report-2018.pdf.
25 We performed the same analysis for surgical day care and radiology multipliers and found similar results.
Examination of Health Care Cost Trends and Cost Drivers Pursuant to G.L. c. 12C, § 17 
Hospital Outpatient Relative Price Compared to Multipliers for  
Laboratory Services for One Massachusetts Payer
Notes:
1. Includes hospitals that contract through the six largest Massachusetts hospital systems but excludes 
hospitals that are not paid based on a fee schedule for these services.
2. Outpatient Relative Price is the 2016 payer-specific Relative Price for HMO and POS products as 
reported by the Center for Health Information and Analysis.
3. The average Outpatient Relative Price in this chart is the unweighted average Outpatient Relative 
Price for this set of hospitals. 
4. The average Laboratory Multiplier in this chart is the payer’s unweighted average Laboratory 
Multiplier for this set of hospitals.
5. Where a contract included negotiated multipliers for ambulatory surgery centers owned by the 
hospital system, those ambulatory surgery centers are included as one hospital in the chart above. 
6.  The Laboratory Multiplier and Outpatient Relative Price for hospital 33 exceed 100% above average 
(Outpatient Relative Price 149% and Laboratory Multiplier 230%).
The existence of intra-hospital price variation creates barriers for purchasers seeking 
to shop for value.  Massachusetts law requires payers to maintain online pricing tools 
that consumers can use to look up price estimates for specific services.26  Although 
these online tools should provide consumers with reasonable estimates of the price 
of services notwithstanding this administrative complexity, reported consumer use 
of such tools is limited.  In FY2016, Massachusetts hospitals reported over 800,000 
discharges and over 15,000,000 hospital outpatient visits.  
26 Mass. Gen. Laws c. 32A, § 27.
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Yet, the largest three Massachusetts payers reported a combined total of only 
103,283 hits in 2016 and 93,297 hits in 2017 on their price transparency online tools.27  
Furthermore, such tools are not available to other purchasers, such as employers, 
who may seek information on comparative costs for particular services when making 
plan and product selections that will shape the health care options available to their 
employees.
For most consumers, shopping for health care services is driven by their plan 
design and out-of-pocket cost exposure.  Tiered network products are intended to 
incentivize consumers to select higher-value providers by offering lower cost sharing 
when a consumer chooses a provider with a preferred tier classification.  However, as 
the graph below indicates, we found that tier placement is not consistently predictive 
of actual hospital outpatient pricing, leading consumers to, in some cases, pay higher 
co-payments when they receive lower-cost services. 
27 See HEALTH POLICY COMM’N, MASS EXEC. OFFICE FOR ADMIN. & FINANCE, 2014 HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS HEARING, PRE-FILED 
TESTIMONY [HEREINAFTER HPC PRE-FILED TESTIMONY]: Blue Cross Blue Shield (2017), available at http://www.mass.gov/anf/budget-taxes-
and-procurement/oversight-agencies/health-policy-commission/public-meetings/annual-cost-trends-hearing/2017/2017-pre-filed-testimony-
questions-bcbsma.pdf; HPC PRE-FILED TESTIMONY: Tufts Health Plan (2017), available at http://www.mass.gov/anf/budget-taxes-and-procurement/
oversight-agencies/health-policy-commission/public-meetings/annual-cost-trends-hearing/2017/2017-pre-filed-testimony-tufts-health-plan.pdf; 
HPC PRE-FILED TESTIMONY: Harvard Pilgrim Health Care (2017), available at http://www.mass.gov/anf/budget-taxes-and-procurement/oversight-
agencies/health-policy-commission/public-meetings/annual-cost-trends-hearing/2017/2017-pre-filed-testimony-questions-harvard-pilgrim.pdf; HPC 
PRE-FILED TESTIMONY: Blue Cross Blue Shield (2018), available at https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/09/17/BCBSMA%20-%202018%20
Pre-Filed%20Testimony%20Questions%20-%20Payers.pdf; HPC PRE-FILED TESTIMONY: Tufts Health Plan (2018), available at https://www.mass.
gov/files/documents/2018/09/17/Tufts%20Health%20Plan%20-%202018%20Pre-Filed%20Testimony%20Questions%20-%20Payers.pdf; HPC PRE-
FILED TESTIMONY: Harvard Pilgrim Health Care (2018), available at https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/09/17/Harvard%20Pilgrim%20
-%202018%20Pre-Filed%20Testimony%20Questions%20-%20Payers.pdf.  These payers also reported a total of 2,163 consumer price inquiries in 
person or over the phone in 2016 and 2,989 such inquiries in 2017.  Id.
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Hospital Surgical Day Care and High-Tech Radiology Prices  
by Tier for One Massachusetts Payer (2018)
Notes:
1. Includes hospitals that contract through the six largest Massachusetts hospital systems but excludes 
hospitals that are not paid based on a fee schedule for these services.
2. Where a contract included negotiated multipliers for ambulatory surgery centers owned by the 
hospital system, those ambulatory surgery centers are included as one hospital in the chart above.
3. The multipliers for hospital 30 exceed three (Surgical Day Care 3.342 and High-Tech Radiology 7.158).
In the graph above, each pair of blue and gray bars represents a hospital’s prices for 
surgical day care and high-tech radiology for one large Massachusetts payer.  The 
hospitals are organized in the graph based on their co-payment tiering level (depicted 
in yellow) for both surgical day care and radiology services.  This chart demonstrates 
that preferred tiered status with a lower co-pay does not always identify lower-cost 
options.  
Service level price transparency is also necessary for health care providers so that 
they can make high value referrals for their patients.  Providers need to know the 
relative prices of different services at different sites of care so they can refer patients 
to high value specialists to contain overall costs, perform on risk contracts, and guide 
patients—who are increasingly likely to be in a high deductible plan—to affordable 
options.  Hospital outpatient rate variation between payers and across service 
categories creates barriers for physicians seeking to make efficient referrals.  For 
example, one payer may have negotiated multipliers with a hospital such that it is 
less expensive for surgical day care but more expensive for radiology, but another 
payer’s negotiation may have yielded the opposite result.  The following chart shows 
multiplier rates for two Massachusetts payers for high-tech radiology, showing that 
identifying a low-cost referral for a particular service may not be possible without 
detailed information by payer.
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Tier 3 Copays:
Surgical Day Care = $500
Radiology = $250
Tier 1 Copays:
Surgical Day Care = $150
Radiology = $75
Tier 2 Copays:
Surgical Day Care = $250
Radiology = $150
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Hospital High-Tech Radiology Prices for Two Massachusetts Payers (2018)
Notes:
1. Includes hospitals that contract through the six largest Massachusetts hospital systems but 
excludes hospitals that are not paid based on a fee schedule for these services.
2. This chart includes the multipliers used to determine prices for High-Tech Radiology services 
for two payers.  For one payer, the chart includes a negotiated multiplier specific to High-
Tech Radiology services.  For the other payer, the chart includes a negotiated multiplier for all 
radiology services (which includes High-Tech Radiology).
3. The averages reflected in this chart are calculated separately for each payer and are based on 
the payer’s unweighted average High-Tech Radiology Multiplier for this set of hospitals.
4. This chart excludes one hospital that is included in the other charts in this report because one of 
these payers reimburses that hospital on a percent of charges basis for these services.
5. Where a contract included negotiated multipliers for ambulatory surgery centers owned by the 
hospital system, those ambulatory surgery centers are included as one hospital in the chart 
above. 
This analysis was possible only where comparable outpatient service categories 
were used by multiple payers for negotiating multipliers to their fee schedules.  As 
discussed in Section 1.A, the largest Massachusetts payers use different service 
groupings for negotiating outpatient prices, which results in cross-payer price 
differences that cannot be modeled with a single multiplier.  This variation contributes 
to the challenge for market participants like providers and employers who must 
assess prices across payers.
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III. Recommendations.
This report documents how commercial health care payment rates are determined using 
complex and varied methods with little consistency across payers, providers, or insurance 
products.  The variation is particularly notable across hospital outpatient services, but we also 
found variation in how hospital inpatient services are reimbursed.  Risk contracts add yet another 
layer of complexity on top of the intricate and opaque fee-for-service foundation that determines 
the provider’s budget and performance.  This complexity and variation create administrative 
costs and are in tension with the actionable price transparency required to drive market-based 
solutions.
Based on these findings, we recommend that all stakeholders, including payers, providers, 
consumer advocates, and policymakers:
1. Study further the administrative costs associated with current approaches to 
reimbursement that vary significantly between insurers, insurance products, market-
segments within insurance products, and providers.  These costs remain hidden in 
part because payers and providers are not required to report or even track how much 
of their annual operating expenses are used to administer provider reimbursement 
contracts.  A working group with representation from providers, payers, and consumer 
advocates could determine a consistent way to report on these costs with the goal of 
developing strategies to reduce them.
2. Reduce complexity and explore increased standardization where appropriate in the 
methods for determining fee-for-service payments and the key terms that govern risk 
contracts.  Simplifying these complicated provisions would require engagement from 
providers and payers and may require a legislative catalyst to facilitate changes to 
historic approaches to payment.
3. Establish real-time, service-level price transparency for employers, consumers, 
policymakers, and providers.  Through the work of the legislature, other agencies, 
and health care stakeholders, Massachusetts has strong public reporting on overall 
measures of provider price variation.  For example, Relative Price data published 
through the Center for Health Information and Analysis (CHIA) provides critical insight 
into aggregate price differences in the market.  However, such aggregate metrics are 
not well tailored to capture variation in prices for specific services or provide real-time 
information needed for employers or consumers to shop for plans or procedures or 
for providers to assess the value of a particular referral.  While current transparency 
initiatives such as CHIA’s release of 2016 service-specific price data28 are significant 
steps in the right direction, a simpler underlying approach to payment would allow for 
new transparency initiatives that would enable purchasers and providers to compare 
options for specific services.   
The Office of the Attorney General looks forward to continued collaboration with the Legislature, 
other agencies, health care market participants, and all stakeholders in promoting the 
affordability and accessibility of health care for all Massachusetts residents.
28 CTR. FOR HEALTH INFO. & ANALYSIS, BULK RELEASE OF PROCEDURE PRICE DATA 2018 (Jul. 20, 2018), available at http://www.chiamass.gov/
transparency-initiatives.
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